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Abstract
We explore whether financial constraints matter and which financial con-
straints matter the most in the choice of becoming an entrepreneur. We
exploit a randomly assigned welfare program in rural Mexico to show that
cash transfers significantly increase entry into entrepreneurship, thereby pro-
viding evidence of financial constraints. We then develop a simple model to
highlight how liquidity and insurance constraints respond differently to the
time profile of expected cash transfers. Exploiting the cross-households varia-
tion in the timing of these transfers, we find that current occupational choices
are significantly more responsive to the amount of transfers expected for the
future than to the amount of transfers currently received. We interpret these
findings as evidence that the program has been effective in promoting micro-
entrepreneurship by enhancing the willingness to bear risk.
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1 Introduction
Poor households face multiple financial constraints. They often lack the possibility
to attain optimal levels of saving, borrowing and insurance against income shocks.
Several dimensions of their lives are affected by these constraints, so much that
“access to finance” is today recognized as a fundamental ingredient of economic
development (see e.g. Banerjee [2003]; Karlan and Morduch [2009]).
At the same time, understanding the effects of an improved access to finance
poses some serious challenges. First, such an improvement seldom occurs for random
reasons, which makes it hard to empirically estimate its effects. Moreover, and
perhaps even more fundamentally, one would like to open the box of “access to
finance” and understand which of the various financial constraints are most binding
in a given situation. This is often complicate but obviously key for the interpretation
of the effects and the design of effective policies.
This paper takes a step along these lines by asking whether financial constraints
matter and which financial constraints matter the most in the choice of becoming
an entrepreneur. The possibility for poor households to set up their own business
is recognized as a key aspect in the process of development (Hausmann and Rodrik
[2003]; Ray [2007]; Naude´ [2010]), while at the same time being often hindered by
financial constraints (Banerjee and Duflo [2005]; Levine [2005]).
We address these questions by first exploiting a random variation in household
income to show that financial constraints prevent some individuals the possibility to
become entrepreneurs. We then decompose financial constraints by distinguishing
in particular whether individuals refrain from becoming entrepreneurs as they lack
enough liquidity to undertake some initial capital investment -what we call liquidity
constraints- or rather as they lack the ability to insure their income against the risk
posed by entrepreneurial returns -what we call insurance constraints. We develop
a simple model to highlight how these constraints respond differently to the time
profile of expected income shocks and exploit the variation in the timing of these
shocks to try separating the effects of liquidity and insurance constraints.
More specifically, we exploit the welfare program Progresa/Oportunidades, which
targets poor households in rural Mexico and provides cash transfers conditional on
their behaviors in health and children education. While Section 2 provides a more
detailed description of the program, we here stress some features which make it
interesting for our exercise. First, the timing of access into Progresa has been ran-
domized, thereby providing us a reliable control group to estimate its effects on
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occupational choices. Second, transfers are administered for an extended and pre-
dictable time period and, albeit partly conditional on schooling behaviors, they
typically represent a sizable increase in households’ wealth. Moreover, and perhaps
most importantly for our purposes, their magnitude and time profile vary substan-
tially according to households demographics; as a result, households face different
(and partly exogenous) shocks to their current liquidity and to their ability to insure
against future income fluctuations.
We start our empirical analysis by simply comparing households in treated and
control communities; we show that living in a treated community significantly in-
creases the probability of entering self-employment both from salaried work and
from unemployment. Furthermore, after a series of test, we can rule out that the
fact that transfers are conditional on sending children to school may explain our
results (as for example it may induce a reallocation of labor within the household).
Hence, we can interpret the treatment impacts as the result of income shocks and
thus as (indirect) evidence that households face financial constraints.
In search of a better understanding of which financial constraints the program
has relaxed the most, and distinguishing in particular liquidity from insurance con-
straints, we exploit the fact that, as mentioned, treated households face significantly
different patterns of transfers. For example, an household with a child in the ninth
grade is entitled to a substantial amount of current transfers but very little transfers
in a year (since in our sample period children stop being eligible after the ninth
grade), while an household with a child in the eighth grade is entitled to somewhat
lower current transfers but much higher future transfers. We then ask in which
household adult members are more likely to become entrepreneurs, and more gener-
ally whether this choice is more responsive to the size of transfers currently received
or to the size of transfers expected for the future.
In order to guide our interpretation, we develop a simple occupational choice
model in which individuals may face liquidity or insurance constraints. If wealth
cannot be freely allocated across periods, due for example to borrowing or saving
constraints, current and future transfers have different effects on the choice of be-
coming entrepreneur. The amount of transfers currently received is better suited to
help incurring start-up costs and so it is more important if liquidity constraints are
binding. Conversely, future transfers are better suited to provide insurance against
future income drops due to business failure and so they have stronger effects if
insurance constraints are binding.
We then test empirically whether the choice of becoming entrepreneur in the
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current period is more responsive to the size of transfers recently received or to
those expected for the future. In order to do so, we first rule out that the very same
household characteristics which determine the profile of transfers determine also
occupational choices. We then show that the probability to become entrepreneur is
significantly more responsive to the amount of transfers expected for the near future
than to the amount currently received.
In our view, these results tend to support the hypothesis that the program has
been effective in promoting micro-entrepreneurship as it has relaxed insurance con-
straints as opposed to simply relaxing current liquidity constraints. While one may
think of alternative stories whereby both current and future transfers matter (for
example, future transfers may be used as collateral for moneylenders; or future in-
vestment may be needed to keep-up with the business needs), it is hard to explain
that future transfers matter more based on liquidity constraints. This may suggest
that financial barriers to entry into self-employment are not the most important
obstacle in our setting (see McKenzie and Woodruff [2006] for similar evidence on
micro-enterprises in urban Mexico). Instead, future transfers matter as they en-
hance the possibility to insure against future income fluctuations. In our case, this
translates into some salaried individuals being willing to undertake the risky choice
of setting up a business.
1.1 Related Literature
This paper builds on the literature on the effects of improved access to finance on
occupational choices. Under non-experimental research designs, Holtz-Eakin et al.
[1994] and Blanchflower and Oswald [1998] show that having received an inheritance
increases the probability of being or remaining self-employed. In experimental set-
tings, de Mel et al. [2008] consider a sample of individual who already have a business
in Sri Lanka and show that a random prize in cash or in kind considerably boosts
their profits. More generally, a substantial literature has explored the effects of im-
proved access to credit and to insurance (see e.g. Besley [1995] and Banerjee [2003]
for reviews). In this literature, however, experimental evidence is still scarce and
very recent (see Banerjee et al. [2009] and Zinman and Karlan [2009] for evidence on
micro-credit in India and in the Philippines, respectively, and Gine´ and Yang [2009]
for evidence on weather insurance in Malawi). Moreover, despite liquidity and in-
surance constraints are often interrelated (Ray [1998]), little has been done to try
separating their effects, which is the main focus of our paper. One notable excep-
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tion is Dercon and Christiaensen [2007], who attempt to distinguish seasonal credit
constraints from inter-temporal constraints related to risk on fertilizer adoption in
rural Ethiopia.
Finally, in spite of the substantial body of research related to Progresa and its
experimental design, to our knowledge no study has explicitly looked at the effects
of the cash transfer on occupational choices. Related and complementary evidence is
provided in Skoufias and Di Maro [2008] who study the incentive effects of Progresa
on adult labor supply and in Gertler et al. [2006], who show that the program
increased productive investments and so long-term welfare.
2 Data
2.1 Program Description
Launched in Mexico in 1997, Progresa is a large scale welfare program mainly aimed
at improving health and human capital accumulation in the poorest rural commu-
nities. It provides households with conditional cash transfers targeted to specific
behaviors in three key areas: nutrition, health and education. Initially, 506 rural
villages were selected to be part of the program evaluation sample. Within those,
320 villages were randomly allocated to the treatment group and 186 villages to
the control group. To check the effectiveness of randomization, Table 1 presents
baseline summary statistics of several individual, household and village character-
istics for the treatment and control groups, as well as the two-sided t-test that the
difference in means is different from zero. None of the variables displays statisti-
cally significant baseline differences, hence confirming that randomization has been
successful in attaining balanced treatment and control populations.
Cash transfers from Progresa are given bimonthly to the female head of eligible
households and they come in two forms.1 The first is a fixed food stipend of 105
Pesos per month conditional on family members obtaining preventive medical care.
The second is an educational scholarships which is provided to each child who is less
than 18 years old and enrolled between the 3rd and the 9th grade, conditional on
1The status of eligible household is based on a welfare index built on asset holdings in the
baseline and it was intended to remain unchanged for the entire duration of the program. However,
around 3000 households were classified as non-poor in the baseline but were later re-classified as
eligible. In order to avoid arbitrary classifications, we exclude them from our analysis (results are
unchanged once we include them).
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attending school a minimum of 85% of the time and not repeating a grade more than
twice. As shown in Figure 1, these transfers vary between 105 and 375 Pesos per
month per child, they increase with school grade and, in grades 7th to 9th, they are
larger for girls than for boys.2 These amounts can be substantial: median benefits
are 176 Pesos per month (roughly 18 USD in 1998), equivalent to about 28% of the
monthly income of beneficiary families.
2.2 The Sample
The evaluation surveys of Progresa consist of socioeconomic characteristics at the
individual level repeatedly collected for 24,077 households, of which about 53% clas-
sified as eligible. A baseline survey was conducted in October 1997 and it has been
followed by Household Evaluation Surveys collected every 6 months for a total of 5
waves after the baseline. Eligible households in treatment communities start receiv-
ing benefits in March-April 1998; whereas eligible households in control communities
were not incorporated until November 1999. In most of our analysis, we focus on
eligible households during the experimental period: in addition to the baseline, we
employ the first three waves of the follow-up surveys, from October 1998 to Octo-
ber 1999. Within this sample, program take-up was remarkably high: 94% of the
treated households and 96% of the control households are reported receiving positive
transfers within 18 months since program offering. Sample attrition is low (11%)
and non response in the occupational choice somewhat larger (17%); however, none
are related to the treatment assignment.
In the baseline, we have information on the main occupation of 20,770 eligi-
ble adult individuals (18 years old or more). Among them, 8% are entrepreneurs
(mostly self-employed), 39% are salaried, and the remaining 53% do not have a paid
occupation (we refer to them as unemployed). The great majority (93%) of the
unemployed are women and the reverse hold for salaried workers, whereas about
25% of the entrepreneurs are women.
We mainly concentrate on the flows into entrepreneurship, i.e. on those individu-
als who are either salaried or unemployed at the baseline and become entrepreneurs
in the follow-up period. Amongst those residing in control villages, 4% become
entrepreneur during in this period, of which roughly 25% were unemployed in the
baseline and 20% are women. Agricultural assets are their main capital endowment:
2These figures are expressed in current Pesos as of the second semester of 1998. Transfer size
has been increased over time in order to adjust for inflation.
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54% of those who become entrepreneurs own productive land, 25% own working ani-
mals such as horses, donkeys and bullocks. These figures are however very similar to
the asset holdings of salaried workers. A distinctive features of new entrepreneurs is
instead their engagement in micro-business activities not (directly) related to agri-
culture: 11% of new entrepreneurs declare to be engaged in activities like handicraft,
sewing clothes and domestic services, whereas the corresponding share for salaried
workers is only 3%.
Moreover, we note that 34% of new entrepreneurs have more than one paid occu-
pation vis-a`-vis 8% of salaried workers. This is common in many developing settings,
and it is typically interpreted as an income smoothing strategy (see e.g. Morduch
[1995], Banerjee and Duflo [2008]). Indeed, also in our sample, new entrepreneurs
face a substantially higher volatility of labor income in their primary occupation,
which may increase their need for self-insurance.3
3 Entrepreneurship and Financial Constraints
Random treatment assignment implies that a simple comparison of treated-control
mean outcomes will likely provide an unbiased estimate of the program impacts.
However, we additionally control for several socioeconomic characteristics that may
affect occupational choices so as to improve the power of the estimates and check
the robustness of our findings. Moreover, although villages were randomly assigned
to the treatment, data are unlikely to be independent across individual observa-
tions. In particular, occupational choices of individuals in the same village may be
correlated as they share background characteristics and are exposed to the same
market environment and natural shocks. In this section, we first introduce a stan-
dard reduced-form empirical framework to evaluate whether the exposure to the
treatment induces some individuals to become entrepreneur. We then provide some
additional evidence to suggest that the program impacts arise from individual re-
sponses to the cash transfers rather than to the conditions (such as schooling be-
haviors) attached to these transfers.
3The standard deviation of monthly labor income is 84% of the sample mean for entrepreneurs
vis-a`-vis 60% for salaried workers.
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3.1 Treatment Impacts
Consider an individual i who is either salaried worker or unemployed in the baseline
and let ne∗i,t be a dummy equal to one if the individual has become entrepreneur
in a given post-program wave t and zero otherwise. Suppose ne∗i,t is determined
by the latent variable nei,t, which denotes individual i’s probability of becoming
entrepreneur. We then estimate regressions of the following form:
nei,t = αTl +X
′
i,t0
γ + δt + ηs + i,t, (1)
where Tl represents the Progresa experimental treatment assignment at the locality
level l and the vector Xi,t0 denotes a set of pre-determined covariates at the individ-
ual, household and locality levels: individual age, gender, education, income, spouse
main occupation, household wealth and demographic composition, village shares of
entrepreneurs and proxies for agricultural risk. We also include wave dummies and
state dummies, δt and ηs.
4 In order to take into account the potential intra-village
correlation of i,t mentioned above, we cluster standard errors at the village level.
Table 2 reports probit marginal effects of the program on the transition into
entrepreneurship. Treatment impacts appear to be both statistically and econom-
ically significant. As shown in columns (1) and (2), living in a treated community
increases the probability of entering self-employment by 0.7 percentage points. This
represents an increase of 19% with respect to the counterfactual sample averages
(equal to 4%). In columns (3)-(6), we show that the treatment significantly in-
creases the probability of entry into entrepreneurship both from salaried work and
from unemployment. In relative terms, the effects across subsamples are of compa-
rable magnitudes: having access to this stable source of extra income increases the
likelihood to become entrepreneur of about 20% in the program period.
As further evidence that the above results are due to the treatment, we also in-
clude the period in which control villages are incorporated into the program (survey
waves 4 and 5), and we slightly modify equation (1) so as to allow for interaction
effects of the treatment indicator with each program wave dummy. The results pro-
vided in Table 3 (columns 1-2) show that indeed treated-control differences tend
to vanish once the control group is incorporated. We also investigate whether our
results may be driven by a pure demand effect, whereby treated villages are richer
and so have an higher demand for entrepreneurs. If this were the case, the treatment
4We cannot specify fixed effects at a more disaggregated geographical level -say, municipality
or village- since this would imply loosing the exogenous variation induced by the experiment.
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effect would hold for all households in a treated village, whether eligible for the pro-
gram or not. The results provided in Columns 3-4 do not support this hypothesis:
there are no treated-control differences for non-eligible individuals. It appears that
being entitled to receive the treatment, as opposed to simply living in a treated vil-
lage, is what increases the probability to become entrepreneur. This result also tends
to exclude within-village spillovers between eligible and non-eligible households in
the choice to become entrepreneur.
3.2 Conditionality
As described in Section 2, cash transfers are conditional on health and schooling
behaviors. In particular, the requirement of sending children to school may have a
direct effect on occupational choices: for example, as children are less likely to work
at home, mothers may be induced to quit a salaried job and turn to self-employment
in search for flexible working hours or home working. This seems however unlikely to
drive our results. First, among those who were salaried and became entrepreneurs in
treated villages, only 6% have children who returned to school in the post-program
period, and only 5% of them are women. Moreover, as shown in Table 4, we find
no differential program impacts on individuals for whom, according to a series of
pre-program characteristics, we expect conditionality to be more or less binding.5
We also notice that if individuals were pushed into entrepreneurship because of
conditionality, one would expect their labor supply to change and in general their
welfare to decrease. The results presented in Table 5, however, offer little support to
this hypothesis. Despite these results should be interpreted as simple correlations (as
we show the choice of becoming entrepreneur is in itself dependent on the treatment),
they show that new entrepreneurs in treated villages have significantly higher labor
earnings and higher non-food expenditures (columns 1-2), not significantly different
food consumption and labor supply (columns 3-5), and they are less likely to be
engaged in a second paid occupation (column 6).6
5Specifically, we consider those who were working longer hours, those who had eligible children
not enrolled in school (who had to actually change their behavior in order to receive the treatment),
those who had eligible children only in primary school age vs. those who had female children in
secondary school age (enrollment in primary school is very high irrespective of the treatment, while
the treatment has a bigger effect on female secondary schooling; see Schultz [2004]).
6These results come from estimating, for each of output yi,t, the parameter γ in the following
equation:
yi,t = αTl + βnei,t + γTl ∗ nei,t +X ′i,t0λ+ ui,t.
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Taken together, this evidence tends to rule out that conditionality is driving our
results, which leads us to interpret the program impacts as the result of an income
shock and thus as (indirect) evidence that households face financial constraints.
4 Liquidity and Insurance Constraints
Absent the program, individuals may refrain from becoming entrepreneurs for at
least two reasons. First, they may face liquidity constraints which prevent them
from undertaking some initial capital investment. The program would then pro-
mote entrepreneurship by increasing households’ current liquidity. Second, individ-
uals may prefer avoiding the risk associated with entrepreneurial returns. In this
case, by providing transfers for an extended and predictable period of time, the
program would promote entrepreneurship by increasing households’ ability to cope
with future income fluctuations. In this section, we first develop a simple model
to highlight how liquidity and insurance constraints respond differently to the time
profile of expected income shocks. We show that, under standard assumptions, the
choice of becoming entrepreneur is more responsive to the amount of transfers cur-
rently received if liquidity constraints are binding, while it is more responsive to the
amount of transfers received in the future if insurance constraints are binding. We
then empirically explore these mechanisms by taking advantage of a second source of
variation. As described in Section 2, beyond random treatment assignment, house-
holds differ in the magnitude and time profile of the transfers they are entitled to,
as determined by the number, grade and gender of their children. We can then test
whether new entrepreneurs are more responsive to the amount of money currently
received or to those expected for the near future.
4.1 A Simple Occupational Choice Model
Consider a population of individuals who are heterogeneous in their initial wealth
a and in their risk aversion r, drawn respectively by smooth distributions F and
G with density f and g. Individuals live for two periods. In the first period, they
choose their occupation: either they become self-employed, which requires a fixed
A similar strategy is used to get a sense of how new entrepreneurs invest the money. We notice
in Table 6 that there is no evidence of increased investment in agricultural activities, such as
acquisition of land, animals or agricultural expenditures or production. On the other hand, there
is evidence of increased nonagricultural activities, in particular carpentry and handicraft.
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investment of k units of capital, or they become salaried. In addition, they choose
the amount of wealth they wish to save from period 1 to period 2. We allow savings to
be positive or negative and normalize the net returns of both saving and borrowing
to zero. We denote with se the amount of savings decided by an individual in case
he becomes entrepreneur and with sw the amount decided in case he becomes a
worker.
In the second period, individuals enjoy the returns from their occupation. The
self-employed get y with probability p and zero otherwise; salaried workers get a
fixed wage w, where
py − k > w.
Savings and occupation are chosen in order to maximize
U = u(x1) + u(x2),
where x1 and x2 denote consumption in period 1 and 2. We make the standard
assumption that u exhibits decreasing absolute risk aversion (DARA) and for sim-
plicity we abstract from time discounting. Finally, irrespective of their choices,
individuals are entitled to cash transfers C1 in period 1 and C2 in period 2.
An individual becomes entrepreneur if his expected utility exceeds what he would
enjoy as a worker, where this difference writes
E = u(a−k−se+C1)+pu(se+y+C2)+(1−p)u(se+C2)−u(a−sw+C1)−u(sw+w+C2).
As standard in this class of models (see e.g. Kihlstrom and Laffont [1979]), there
exists a threshold level of risk aversion r∗ such that those with r ≤ r∗ prefer being
entrepreneurs. In addition, these individuals must have sufficient wealth a ≥ k−C1
to incur the initial capital investment.
We are interested in exploring how the equilibrium share of self-employed, de-
noted with ne, varies with the transfers C1 and C2. Using the envelope theorem, it
can be shown that
dE
dC1
= u
′
(a− k − se + C1)− u′(a− sw + C1), (2)
and
dE
dC2
= pu
′
(se + y + C2) + (1− p)u′(se + C2)− u′(sw + w + C2). (3)
To set a benchmark, we first describe an ideal world in which individuals face no
constraints in allocating wealth across periods and so current and future transfers
are equivalent.
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4.1.1 Equivalence between current and future transfers
Suppose there are no constraints on borrowing or saving. Individuals who become
workers set sw such that their marginal utility is equalized across periods, i.e.
u
′
(a− sw + C1) = u′(sw + w + C2), (4)
and in the same way those who become entrepreneurs choose se such that
u
′
(a− k − se + C1) = pu′(se + y + C2) + (1− p)u′(se + C2). (5)
Substituting (4) and (5) into (2) and (3), we can see that
dne
dC1
=
dne
dC2
, (6)
and so occupational choices respond in the same way to current and future trans-
fers. This result is not surprising. In a world in which wealth can be freely and
costlessly allocated across periods, individuals see no fundamental difference be-
tween the transfers they have received today and those they known they will receive
tomorrow.
We do not expect however this to be typically the case. Borrowing constraints are
widely documented (restricting to developing countries, see the surveys in Banerjee
[2003] and Karlan and Morduch [2009]). Households may also face saving con-
straints, as the result of present-biased preferences (Ashraf et al. [2006], Dupas and
Robinson [2009], Banerjee and Mullainathan [2010]), social norms (Platteau [2000]),
or simply unavailability of a safe storage technology (see Collins et al. [2009] and the
survey by Karlan and Morduch [2009]). We then turn to a setting in which some in-
dividuals may face constraints in their choice of se and sw. These constraints break
the equivalence between current and future transfers and allow us to compare the
effects of these transfers in two extreme cases: one in which there are only liquidity
constraints (k > 0 and individuals are risk neutral) and one in which there are only
insurance constraints (k = 0 and individuals are risk averse).
4.1.2 Liquidity constraints
Consider first the case in which individuals are risk neutral. Given that in this
case everyone would like to become entrepreneur and so invest in period 1, saving
constraints are never binding (and we are back to the case in which se and sw can
freely move). On the other hand, borrowing constraints may bind. Consider for
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the sake of illustration (extreme) borrowing constraints which impose se ≥ 0 and
sw ≥ 0.7
In this case, only those with a ≥ k−C1 become entrepreneurs. Hence, for them,
we would have
∂ne
∂C1
= f(k − C1) > 0 and ∂ne
∂C2
= 0. (7)
The effect of changing C1 and C2 in this setting depends on the fraction of the
population for whom borrowing constraints do not bind, and so equation (6) hold,
and the fraction for whom borrowing constraints bind, and so equation (7) hold.
Still, we can say that in general the share of self-employed in period 1 is more
responsive to the amount of period 1 transfers (as these help overcome liquidity
needs) than to period 2 transfers (as these may not be pledged for obtaining cash
in period 1 and incur the investment).
4.1.3 Insurance constraints
We now abstract from liquidity constraints by assuming k = 0. In this case, all those
who are sufficiently tolerant toward risk become self-employed, i.e. ne = G(r∗).
Suppose there are (extreme) borrowing constraints (se ≥ 0 and sw ≥ 0) so that
some individuals, even by not saving, are consuming too little in the first period (as
they would like to borrow). This requires that for sw = 0
u
′
(a+ C1) > u
′
(w + C2), (8)
and for se = 0
u
′
(a+ C1) > pu
′
(y + C2) + (1− p)u′(C2). (9)
Consider first those for whom (8) and (9) hold. By substituting se = sw = 0 into
(2) and (3), we see that for them
∂ne
∂C1
= 0 and
∂ne
∂C2
= g(r∗)
∂r∗
∂C2
> 0, (10)
where ∂r∗/∂C2 > 0 follows from the fact that u is DARA and so increasing C2
increases risk-taking through a classic wealth effect (Pratt [1964]). Those for whom
only (8) holds set se > 0 and sw = 0 and they too are more responsive to future
than to current transfers. This can be shown by substituting sw = 0 into (2) and
(3) and combining (5) and (8).8
7Our results would hold with less extreme assumptions on savings or borrowing constraints.
8Notice that no individual who is marginal in the occupational choice sets se = 0 and sw > 0.
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Suppose instead there are (extreme) saving constraints (se ≤ 0 and sw ≤ 0) so
that some individuals, even by not borrowing, are consuming too much in the first
period (as they would like to save). This requires that for sw = 0
u
′
(a+ C1) < u
′
(w + C2), (11)
and for se = 0
u
′
(a+ C1) < pu
′
(y + C2) + (1− p)u′(C2). (12)
Those for which (11) and (12) hold set se = sw = 0 and we are back to the case
presented in equation (10). Also those for whom only (12) holds (and so they set
se = 0 and sw < 0) are more responsive to future than to current transfers. This
can be shown by substituting se = 0 into (2) and (3) and combining (4) and (12).9
As in the previous section, the effect of changing C1 and C2 depends on the
fraction of the population who can optimally set its savings or borrowing and the
fraction for whom either borrowing or saving constraints bind. Still, we can say that,
in this setting, the share of self-employed in period 1 is more responsive to period 2
than to period 1 transfers. The reasons is that, in order to self-insure, households
need to have enough wealth in period 2. In case of binding saving constraints, they
cannot transfer wealth from period 1 to period 2, which makes them insensitive to
C1. At the same time, those with binding borrowing constraints consume all their
wealth in period 1 (and still they would prefer consuming more). Hence, increasing
C1 does not make them richer in period 2 and so does not affect their willingness to
take risk.
As a summary of the above results, we state the following Proposition.
Proposition 1 Suppose individuals face constraints in allocating transfers across
periods. Then current occupational choices are more responsive to the size of current
transfers if liquidity constraints bind, while they are more responsive to the size of
future transfers if insurance constraints bind.
In fact, due to DARA utility, we have u
′
(s+w +C2) < pu
′
(s+ y +C2) + (1− p)u′(s+C2) when
E = 0. Hence, imposing sw = se = s would imply that this individual would save too much when
salaried and so he would always set se ≥ sw.
9Again, for the same argument developed in Footnote 9, the case se < 0 and sw = 0 is irrelevant
as inconsistent with se ≥ sw.
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4.2 Empirical Strategy
In what follows, we restrict our attention to eligible salaried workers residing in
treated villages.10 We are then interested in evaluating how the probability to
become entrepreneur nei,t depends on the amount of transfers received by household
h in the previous six months Ch,t and on the transfers they know they will receive
in the next six months Ch,t+1.
11
As an example of the variation in transfer amounts, suppose we are at the end
of the academic year and we consider two households with a 15 years old daughter
as a single child. In the first household the daughter is enrolled in the eighth grade
and so, according to the rules described in Section 2, the household has received
2130 Pesos in the previous six months and will receive 2250 Pesos in the following
six months. In the second household, the daughter is enrolled in the ninth grade,
and as a result the household has received 2250 Pesos in the previous six months
but will only receive 630 Pesos in the following six months (since as mentioned
after the ninth grade children are no more eligible for the educational component
of the transfer). We then ask in which household adult members are more likely to
become entrepreneurs. Of course, this is just one of the several discontinuities in
transfer amounts induced by the program’s rules. In what follows, we pool those
discontinuities across program eligible children by defining for each household the
potential transfers it is entitled to receive.
We use potential transfers and not actual transfers since, beside being possibly
measured with error, the latter partly depend on the household’s behavior with re-
spect to children enrollment, and this is likely to be simultaneously determined with
occupational choices. We define potential transfers Ph,t and Ph,t+1 as the amount
of transfers a household would be entitled to if its children did not change their
pre-program enrollment decisions and, when enrolled, progressed by one grade in
each year. These transfers are deterministic functions of children’s characteristics
10Unemployment seems unlikely to be driven by risk preferences in our setting.
11Six months correspond to the shortest time frame we can define such that future transfers
are systematically different from current transfers according to the school calendar year. We later
consider a one-year time horizon for robustness. Also, since we do not know exactly the date in
which individuals have changed occupation between two survey waves, current and future transfers
are constructed by taking the month of the interview as the reference. It follows that our future
amounts are certainly received after individuals have changed occupation, while part of our current
amounts may sometimes still be due at the time in which they switch occupation. If this were the
case, our estimates on the differential effects of future vs. current transfers should be interpreted
as a lower bound.
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at baseline and by construction they are uncorrelated with any behavioral response
to the program.12
We then estimate the following model using alternatively current and future
potential transfers as explanatory variable:
nei,t = α1Ph,t + Child
′
h,tβ1 + i,t, (13)
nei,t = α2Ph,t+1 + Child
′
h,tβ2 + ui,t, (14)
where the vector Childh,t contains age-specific categorical variables for the num-
ber of boys and girls who are between 6 and 17 years old in each household h
and post-treatment period t. This controls for any independent effect of children
demographics on occupational choices.
The key identifying assumption for estimation of the α parameters in equations
(13) and (14) is that, absent the program, occupational choices respond to children
demographics and not to the specific school grade in which children are enrolled.
Therefore, partial variations in potential transfers across households with children
of the same age but attending different grades should be exogenous. To test this
assumption, we look at two alternative placebo samples: program-eligible households
living in control villages and non-eligible households living in treated villages. We
construct the transfers they would have been entitled to had they been treated, and
look at whether entry into self-employment is directly affected by these transfers. If
this were the case, our approach would be invalid since occupational choices would
be driven by the exact household characteristics that determine the transfers rather
than by the transfers themselves. As shown in Table 7, however, estimates reveal
no direct effect of potential transfers on occupational choices in these samples.
Finally, instead of estimating the effects of current and future transfers sepa-
rately, we directly test for their differential impact on the probability to become
entrepreneur. For this purpose, we consider the following alternative specification:
nei,t = α3Dh,t + Child
′
h,tβ3 + ηh,t, (15)
where Dh,t is defined as the difference between future and current transfers, Ph,t+1−
Ph,t.
12The average potential transfers received in the past six months are 1446 Pesos (std. dev. 863)
and the average potential transfers to be received in the next six months are 1553 Pesos (std. dev.
964).
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4.3 Results
In order to first provide a visual inspection of our relationships of interest, we esti-
mate equations (13) and (14) non-parametrically. As shown in Figure 2, the shape
of the curves suggests that current transfers do not have any effect on the proba-
bility to become entrepreneur. On the contrary, this probability seems to depend
positively on the amount of transfers that households are entitled to receive in the
near future, especially after a certain amount (around 2000 Pesos).
These patterns are confirmed in standard probit estimation of equations (13) and
(14). In Table 8, we report the marginal effects of current and future cash transfers
on the likelihood to switch from salaried work to self-employment. Columns (1)-(2)
display the results for the transfers received in the last six months. There is weak
evidence in favor of a positive effect, which however vanishes once control variables
are included. This reveals no significant effect of current transfers on the probability
to become entrepreneur. Columns (3)-(6) report the results for future transfers
using either a 6-months or a 1-year horizon. The size of future transfers appears a
significant determinant of the probability to switch to self-employment. This effect is
substantial: a one standard deviation increase in 6-months future transfers increases
the average probability to become entrepreneur by 1.2%. This amounts to a 12%
increase vis-a`-vis the average share of new entrepreneurs in this sample (9.6%). In
relative terms, the corresponding effects for 1-year future transfers are similar: a
one standard deviation increase leads to 0.9% more self-employed, which is a 10%
increase.
In order directly estimate any differential impact of current vs. future transfers,
and so provide a sharper test of liquidity vs. insurance channels, we now turn to
the model in equation (15). As shown in columns (1)-(2) of Table 9, these estimates
provide evidence that the probability to become entrepreneur is significantly more
responsive to the amount of future transfers than to the amount of current transfers.
In terms of magnitude, a one standard deviation increase in the difference between
future and current transfers (equal to 0.42) increases the probability to shift to self-
employment by 1.2%, which matches our previous estimates in levels. Moreover, in
columns (3)-(6), we have included the amount of current transfers and the difference
between future and current transfers in wave 1, respectively, in order to compare
similar households in terms of children demographics that are facing an upward
or downward stream of transfers. Results barely change: households facing an
increasing stream of transfers are on average more likely to switch occupation and
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become self-employed.
It is also interesting to notice that the magnitude of these effects is consistent
with the reduced-form treatment impacts described in Section 3, in spite of the
fact that they arise from two potentially different sources of variation. For salaried
individuals in treated villages, the treatment increases the probability to become
entrepreneur by 1.5% with respect to the control group (see Table 2, column 4),
while a standard deviation increase in the difference between future and current
transfers increases such probability by 1.2%. This suggests that the time profile of
the transfers is key for explaining the program effects on occupational choices.
To summarize, in our view, these results tend to support the hypothesis that the
cash transfers have been effective in promoting micro-entrepreneurship as they have
enhanced the willingness to bear risk as opposed to simply relaxing current liquidity
constraints.
5 Conclusions
We have explored the response of occupational choices to the income shocks induced
by the Mexican program Progresa. We have first documented that the probability
to become entrepreneur increases by about 20% for treated households. We have
then shown that current occupational choices are significantly more responsive to the
amount of transfers expected for the future than to the amount of transfers currently
received. Moreover, according to our estimates, the differential impact of future
vs. current transfers is comparable in magnitude to the treated-control difference,
which confirms that the time profile of the transfers is key in explaining the program
effects. We have interpreted these results as evidence that in our setting insurance
constraints are fundamental determinants of the choice of becoming entrepreneurs.
Our results feature some limitations. For example, little is known on the long
run effects of these dynamics. In a related study, Gertler et al. [2006] argue that
productive investments induced by Progresa had persistent effects on individual
welfare. We conjecture that changes in occupational choices are likely to display
similar features, but a detailed analysis of this issue is left to further investigation.
Moreover, we have not fully addressed the possibility of general equilibrium effects
induced by the program. As a first step, we have shown that indirect effects on
non-eligible households in treated communities are not significant. However, we
cannot say whether the above described dynamics are only improving the welfare
of those who have changed occupation or they are also altering the functioning of
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some markets (e.g. in terms of increased labor demand or total production).
Nonetheless, we think our analysis can inform the debate on financial constraints
and entrepreneurship in developing countries. First, we have shown that it is pos-
sible to promote welfare-enhancing entrepreneurship.13 Second, according to our
estimates, financial barriers to entry into entrepreneurship do not seem insurmount-
able. Instead, a major barrier may come from the risky prospects self-employment
offers. In this view, promoting entrepreneurship requires reducing households’ ex-
posure to risk in other dimensions.
13Instead, in face of many failed attempts, skeptics question whether policy makers can promote
entrepreneurship at all (see e.g. Holtz-Eakin [2000], Acs and Szerb [2007], Parker [2007], Shane
[2009] for a discussion).
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Tables and Figures
Table 1: Baseline Characteristics and Covariate Balance
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Treated-Control Diff. T-Stats
Main Occupation
Self-Employed 0.074 0.262 0.019 1.62
Unemployed 0.534 0.499 -0.005 -0.51
Salaried 0.392 0.488 -0.013 -1.22
Individual Characteristics
Age 39.263 13.877 -0.254 -0.65
Female 0.541 0.498 0.006 1.09
Income Main Occup. 247.445 344.452 -11.243 -1.29
Income Other Occup. 56.354 339.52 -4.599 -0.72
Labor Supply 20.054 23.148 -0.002 -0.01
Years of Education 2.707 2.628 0.068 0.51
Household’s Assets
Asset Index (Score) 638.14 82.489 0.399 0.23
Land Used 1.219 2.697 -0.071 -0.62
Land Owned 0.561 0.496 0.028 0.97
Working Animals 0.318 0.466 0.025 1.10
Household’s Composition
Female HH Head 0.048 0.213 -0.004 -0.46
child05 0.700 0.458 -0.003 -0.19
child612 0.708 0.455 -0.014 -1.20
child1315 0.394 0.489 -0.011 -0.76
child1621 0.370 0.483 0.003 0.35
men2139 0.606 0.489 0.002 0.16
men4059 0.352 0.478 -0.002 -0.17
men60 0.128 0.334 0.002 0.11
women2139 0.692 0.462 -0.014 -0.74
women4059 0.295 0.456 -0.003 -0.43
women60 0.125 0.33 -0.002 -0.29
Locality Characteristics
Number of Shocks 1.62 1.088 -0.036 -0.69
Share of Entrepreneurs 0.092 0.086 0.003 -0.18
Crop Diversification 2.336 0.705 -0.014 1.41
Note: This table presents baseline summary statistics for the treatment and
control groups and the two-sided t-test that the difference in means is statisti-
cally significantly different from zero; standard errors are clustered at the village
level.
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Figure 1: Monthly Transfers per Child
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
Grade Attended
C
u r
r e
n t
 P
e s
o s
 a
t  J
u l
- D
i c
 1
9 9
8
Male Female
Note: This figure shows per-child monthly transfers an eligible household is potentially entitled
to receive as a function of the grade and the gender of the child. Amounts are expressed in current
Pesos as of the second semester of 1998 and they have been increased over time in order to adjust
for inflation.
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Table 2: Probability to Become Entrepreneur: Average Treatment Impacts
Sample All Former Salaried Former Unemployed
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treat 0.009 0.007 0.017 0.015 0.006 0.004
(0.004)*** (0.003)*** (0.008)** (0.008)* (0.003)** (0.002)**
Mean Dep. Var. 0.037 0.074 0.016
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
State Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Wave Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo R-squared 0.033 0.124 0.040 0.055 0.046 0.199
Number of Obs 47219 46271 17421 17094 26680 26154
Number of Localities 504 500 496 492 504 500
Note: This table reports probit marginal effects of the program on the probability to become en-
trepreneur. * denotes significance at 10%; ** significance at 5%; *** significance at 1%. Standard
errors are clustered at the village level. Baseline control variables include age, age squared, years
of education, gender, income (labor and other sources), households’ demographics, assets (land and
animals), welfare index (score) and villages’ main economic activity, agricultural shocks, crop diver-
sification and share of entrepreneurs.
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Table 3: Probability to Become Entrepreneur: Placebo
Sample Eligibles Non Eligibles
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Treat*Wave1 0.0004 0.0001
(0.0061) (0.0047)
Treat*Wave2 0.0155 0.0115
(0.0069)** (0.0054)**
Treat*Wave3 0.0172 0.0131
(0.0092)** (0.0074)**
Treat*Wave4 0.0092 0.0076
(0.0066) (0.0053)
Treat*Wave5 0.0053 0.0035
(0.0066) (0.0048)
Treat 0.004 0.004
(0.005) (0.004)
Controls No Yes No Yes
State Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Wave Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Obs 78115 76560 15464 15148
Pseudo R-squared 0.034 0.128 0.02 0.13
Number of Localities 505 501 450 445
Note: This table reports probit marginal effects of the program on the
probability to become entrepreneur. * denotes significance at 10%; **
significance at 5%; *** significance at 1%. Standard errors are clustered
at the village level. Baseline control variables include age, age squared,
years of education, gender, income (labor and other sources), house-
holds’ demographics, assets (land and animals), welfare index (score)
and villages’ main economic activity, agricultural shocks, crop diversifi-
cation and share of entrepreneurs.
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Table 4: Baseline Characteristics and Conditionality
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Treat*Labor 0.00005
(0.0004)
Labor -0.0002
(0.0003)
Treat*Female 0.052
(0.039)
Female 0.066
(0.042)*
Treat*Non Enroll -0.005
(0.012)
Non Enroll 0.010
(0.011)
Treat*Prim Sec 0.007
(0.023)
Prim vs. Sec -0.043
(0.025)*
Treat 0.012 0.013 0.018 0.012
(0.020) (0.008) (0.010)* (0.021)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
State Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Wave Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Obs 16966 17094 12630 8744
Pseudo R-squared 0.055 0.056 0.056 0.054
Number of Localities 492 492 488 480
Note: This table reports probit marginal effects of the pro-
gram on the probability to become entrepreneur. * denotes
significance at 10%; ** significance at 5%; *** significance at
1%. Standard errors are clustered at the village level. Baseline
control variables include age, age squared, years of education,
gender, income (labor and other sources), households’ demo-
graphics, assets (land and animals), welfare index (score) and
villages’ main economic activity, agricultural shocks, crop di-
versification and share of entrepreneurs.
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Table 5: Welfare and Labor Supply
Dependent Variable Labor Earn Non-food Exp Food Cons Hrs Work Days Work Sec Occup
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treat*New Entrep 17.389 33.003 12.552 0.044 -0.085 -0.117
(8.055)** (13.944)** (9.755) (0.193) (0.179) (0.055)**
Treat -3.902 16.770 17.950 -0.017 -0.038 -0.010
(4.039) (7.512)** (5.452)*** (0.034) (0.041) (0.009)
New Entrep -77.698 -22.441 -9.414 -0.169 -0.219 0.235
(6.074)*** (11.756)* (8.160) (0.143) (0.134) (0.045)***
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Wave Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Obs 32988 33036 30863 10441 15219 10763
R-squared 0.152 0.120 0.030 0.020 0.032 0.051
Number of Localities 494 495 495 488 488 483
Note: This table reports OLS estimates of the program on labor earnings (column 1), non-food expen-
ditures (column 2), food consumption (column 3), hours worked (column 4), days worked (column 5) and
on the probability to be engaged in a second paid occupation (column 5). * denotes significance at 10%;
** significance at 5%; *** significance at 1%. Standard errors are clustered at the village level. Baseline
control variables include age, age squared, years of education, gender, income (labor and other sources),
households’ demographics, assets (land and animals), welfare index (score) and villages’ main economic
activity, agricultural shocks, crop diversification and share of entrepreneurs.
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Table 6: Investments
Dependent Variable Carpenter Handicraft Agri Expend Animal Agri Product Land
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treat*New Entrep 0.012 0.048 56.983 30.883 -3.946 -0.037
(0.004)*** (0.021)** (57.937) (34.977) (8.337) (0.044)
Treat -0.005 0.010 -50.395 0.841 -6.583 0.044
(0.004) (0.006)* (34.229) (2.347) (4.477) (0.023)*
New Entrep -0.003 0.028 -112.147 2.738 5.423 0.083
(0.002) (0.010)*** (51.669)** (8.525) (5.832) (0.034)**
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Wave Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Obs 53195 53195 15996 17584 15617 35333
R-squared 0.038 0.094 0.079 0.006 0.009 0.081
Number of Localities 503 503 481 497 497 497
Note: This table reports OLS estimates of the program on the probability to be engaged in carpentry
(column 1), handicraft (column 2), agricultural expenditures (column 3), animal stocks (column 4),
agricultural production (column 5) and land owned or used (column 5). * denotes significance at
10%; ** significance at 5%; *** significance at 1%. Standard errors are clustered at the village level.
Baseline control variables include age, age squared, years of education, gender, income (labor and other
sources), households’ demographics, assets (land and animals), welfare index (score) and villages’ main
economic activity, agricultural shocks, crop diversification and share of entrepreneurs.
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Table 7: Current and Future Transfers: Placebo
Sample Poor in Control Villages Non-poor in Treated Villages
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Current (6 months) -0.0004 -0.0002
(0.0072) (0.0151)
Future (6 months) -0.0071 -0.0077
(0.0063) (0.0153)
Future (1 year) -0.0025 -0.0050
(0.0033) (0.0089)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Wave Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Obs 6814 6814 6814 2846 2846 2846
Pseudo R-squared 0.038 0.039 0.039 0.038 0.038 0.038
Number of Localities 181 181 181 255 255 255
Note: This table reports probit marginal effects of the transfers on the probability to become
entrepreneur. Standard errors are clustered at the village level. Control variables include
age-specific categorical variables for the number of boys and girls between 6 and 17 years
old.
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Figure 2: Current and Future Transfers: Non-parametric Estimates
Note: This figure shows non-parametric estimates (based on Local Linear Regression Smoothers)
of the effect of current and future transfer amounts on the probability to become entrepreneur.
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Table 8: Current and Future Transfers: Levels
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Current (6 months) 0.008 0.005
(0.004)* (0.005)
Future (6 months) 0.009 0.012
(0.004)** (0.005)***
Future (1 year) 0.004 0.005
(0.002)** (0.002)**
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
State Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Wave Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Obs 10607 10607 10607 10607 10607 10607
Pseudo R-squared 0.045 0.049 0.046 0.050 0.045 0.050
Number of Localities 315 315 315 315 315 315
Note: This table reports probit marginal effects of the transfers on the probability to become en-
trepreneur. * denotes significance at 10%; ** significance at 5%; *** significance at 1%. Standard
errors are clustered at the village level. Control variables include age-specific categorical variables
for the number of boys and girls between 6 and 17 years old.
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Table 9: Current and Future Transfers: Differences
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Future-Current (6 months) 0.026 0.028 0.024 0.030 0.029 0.032
(0.009)*** (0.009)*** (0.009)*** (0.009)*** (0.009)*** (0.009)***
Current (6 months) 0.007 0.007
(0.004)* (0.005)
Past Trend (6 months) 0.007 -0.006
(0.011) (0.013)
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
State Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Wave Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Obs 10607 10607 10607 10607 10175 10175
Pseudo R-squared 0.046 0.051 0.046 0.051 0.047 0.052
Number of Localities 315 315 315 315 308 308
Note: This table reports probit marginal effects of the transfers on the probability to become entrepreneur.
* denotes significance at 10%; ** significance at 5%; *** significance at 1%. Standard errors are clustered
at the village level. Control variables include age-specific categorical variables for the number of boys and
girls between 6 and 17 years old.
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